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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
REGULATIONS: ANOTHER ATTEMPT
TO CONTROL REDLINING
Refusal of lending institutions to lend or invest in specific geographic
areas is commonly referred to as redlining. I Instances of redlining are well
documented, 2 despite bank allegations that they adequately meet their
communities' credit needs. Redlined areas usually contain lower-to-mid-
dle-income residents, older homes, and a changing racial composition.
3
Although there is some evidence that redlining is motivated by racial bias,4
redlined areas are generally considered bad credit risks by those who set a
lending institution's economic investment policies.5 Although most banks
1. Generally, redlining occurs within a section of the larger area serviced by the bank.
Redlining encompasses a variety of practices including the refusal to accept loan applica-
tions within a designated area, the refusal to make loans secured by property within a desig-
nated area, the refusal to make real estate loans unless secured or guaranteed by mortgage
insurance, granting loans with more burdensome terms, or refusing a loan on property older
than a certain age. See Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judicial Action. Are Erasers APail-
able, 29 VAND. L. REV. 987, 990 (1976). See also Comment, The Legality of Redlining
Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 463, 465 (1976).
2. Studies documenting the existence of redlining include the following: Center for
Applied Urban Research, The University of Nebraska at Omaha, Housing and Business
Investment in Nebraska's Non-Metropolitan Communities and Declining Urban Neighbor-
hoods (1976); Center for New Corporate Priorities, Where the Money Is: Mortgage Lending,
Los Angeles County (1975); D.C. Public Interest Research Group, Redlining: Mortgage Dis-
investment in the District of Columbia (1975); Urban-Suburban Investment Study Group,
Center for Urban Studies of the University of Illinois, Redlining and Disinvestment as a
Discriminatory Practice in Residential Mortgage Loans (1977).
3. See Comment, supra note 1, at 465.
4. See, e.g., The Center for Community Change, The National Urban League, The
National Survey of Housing Abandonment (1971). This study indicates that real estate ex-
ploitation in black housing caused inflated mortgage prices. Consequently, many black
homeowners defaulted. A number of banks experiencing these defaults subsequently re-
fused to lend in racially changing neighborhoods. They based their refusal partially on ac-
ticipated frequency of loan default by blacks. Id at 13-14. See also National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., Patterns and Practices of Discrimination in Oak-
land, California (Feb. 1972) [hereinafter cited as NCADH Study]. This study notes that the
federal government, by actively encouraging racial ghettoization in the 1930s and 1940s,
established discriminatory lending patterns by its regulated institutions. Id at 2. See also
Office of Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Private Lending Institu-
tions Questionnaire, Initial Report on Returns (April 25, 1972) (unpublished survey of all
government supervised lending institutions). Ninety-nine of 582 savings and loan associa-
tions studied in 50 cities admitted considering neighborhood racial composition in evaluat-
ing loan applications. Id at 5.
5. See Renne, supra note 1, at 991. Various economic factors contribute to an institu-
tion's policy judgment that lower income, racially transitional areas are bad credit risks.
First, these areas tend to be older urban neighborhoods. Since older property may require
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contend that their reluctance to lend in certain areas is a reaction to urban
decay or disinvestment, many other groups maintain that the inability of
residents to obtain credit itself has caused deterioration.6 Regardless of
whether it is considered a cause or effect of urban disinvestment, however,
redlining inevitably contributes to the further decline of an area.
The federal government, although extensively involved in housing and
urban development for nearly fifty years, 7 historically assumed a hands-off
policy toward redlining.8 Thus, civil rights statutes provided the sole vehi-
cle for challenging redlining practices. 9 The existence of such policies,
periodic inspection to determine its continued value as collateral, administrative costs on
urban loans are higher. Secondly, there is some evidence that, on occasion, loans to urban
residents result in higher default and foreclosure rates than to their suburban counterparts.
Thirdly, older or deteriorated urban property is unsatisfactory collateral; a lending institu-
tion is less likely to recoup its investment upon default in these areas than in suburban areas
with newer homes. See Comment, supra note 1, at 466-68. A bank's decision not to lend,
however, is often based solely on the location of the applicant's property within a redlined
area; the individual merits of the applicant's property are not even investigated. On the
other hand, applications in nonredlined areas will be considered on the creditworthiness of
the particular applicant and the appraised value of the particular property sought to be
financed. See Renne, supra note I, at 992.
6. Proponents of the view that redlining is the cause of urban deterioration argue that
the process begins when lenders decide not to invest in a fairly healthy community. See,
e.g., Urban Suburban Investment Study Group, supra note 2, at 12 (testimony of Frances E.
Werner), in which six phases of deterioration are identified: 1) a healthy community exists;
2) the decision by the lender to disinvest; 3) those who are able flee the area; 4) those remain-
ing in the area can obtain only government insured loans or private financing; 5) the proph-
ecy of deterioration is realized; and 6) the area becomes blighted and qualifies for urban
renewal. See also D.C. Public Interest Research Group, supra note 2, at 1. Other studies
assume that disinvestment occurs much later in the cycle of deterioration. See, e.g., The
Center for Community Change, The National Urban League, supra note 4. This study iden-
tifies six stages in the process: i) decline in the area's socio-economic status; 2) racial or
ethnic changes; 3) speculation; 4) declining market conditions; 5) disinvestment; and 6)
abandonment. Id at 3-10.
7. The federal investment of dollars in housing and urban development, totaling hun-
dreds of billions of dollars, is considered by some housing experts as the single greatest force
in determining and shaping economic and social growth in metropolitan areas. See M.
SLOANE, FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, printed in SuBcoMM.
ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 131 (Comm. Print 1976).
8. Prior to 1960, the federal government's housing policy tolerated, and even en-
couraged, racial segregation. For example, in the 1930s and 1940s, the FHA Underwriting
Manual recommended restrictive covenants that would prevent purchase of properties by
members of an area's minority race. M. SLOANE, supra note 7, at 135. In 1948, the Supreme
Court found that such covenants were unenforceable by the courts. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). It was not until the 1960s that the federal government actively began to
encourage fair housing. M. SLOANE, supra note 7, at 142.
9. Discrimination in real estate sales and financing, and in some cases redlining itself,
have been challenged under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976); Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 601 to 605, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976); and
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however, has been acknowledged by Congress.' 0 More recently, the fed-
eral government has sought to eliminate discriminatory lending practices,
including redlining, through regulation of lending conditions."I However,
neither the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),' 2 which prohibits dis-
crimination in lending, nor the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 13 which
requires lending institutions to disclose the number and amounts of mort-
gages granted, has been particularly effective in deterring redlining.14
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 [The Fair Housing Act], §§ 804 to 805, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3604 to 3605 (1976). See notes 18-66 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 95-175], reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., COMPI-
LATION OF THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1977, 307 (Comm. Print
1977).
At the Joint Agency Hearings held on the Community Reinvestment Act prior to the
promulgation of agency regulations, numerous witnesses presented evidence of existing red-
lining practices. For example, in a particular one-year period, Williamsburgh Savings Bank,
located in Brooklyn, New York, received $932 million from local depositors and granted
mortgages in Brooklyn of $35 million. In contrast, a branch office in more affluent Suffolk
County collected only $75 million in deposits but lent $243 million in mortgages. Proposed
Regulations to the Community Reinvestment Act: Joint Hearings Before the Financial Regula-
tory Agencies, 95th Cong.,lst Sess. 332 (1978) (statement of Rep. Fred Richmond). Like-
wise, Northeast Federal Savings & Loan Association received 40% of its total assets of $14
billion from the Kensington section of Philadelphia. Nonetheless, in 1975, Northeast did
not grant any mortgages in Kensington. Id at 71 (statement of Rev. Robert A. Young, Jr.,
Kensington Action Now) (Kensington is an area composed of predominantly white, lower
income residents). In West Virginia, coal miners have difficulty obtaining mortgage loans
for houses but can obtain loans on mobile homes at higher interest rates. Id at 286 (state-
ment of Jeff Zinsmeyer, Center for Community Change).
11. See generally Searing, Discrimination in Home Finance, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1113
(1973). The FHA's discriminatory policies discussed in note 7 supra began to change two
years after the Supreme Court declared its racially restrictive covenants illegal. See M.
SLOANE, supra note 7, at 135.
Government regulation of lending institutions and the mortgage industry is extensive.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) charters and regulates savings and loan
associations and also regulates state-chartered members of the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The Comptroller of the Currency charters and regulates
national commercial banks. The Federal Reserve Board monitors state-chartered banks
which are not members of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) insures state-chartered banks which are not members of the Federal
Reserve System. Besides direct regulation of banks, the federal government has created
vehicles for purchasing mortgages (the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association).
Additionally, the federal government insures real estate loans at low interest rates under the
FHA and VA programs. See Renne, supra note 1, at 994-96.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f (1976). The ECOA prohibits discriminatory lending prac-
tices based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age or receipt of
public assistance funds. Id at 1691(a)(1) & (2).
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976).
14. See S. REP. No. 95-175, supra note 10, at 33.
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In a recent attempt to deal with the problem, Congress enacted the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as Title VIII of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977.15 The CRA states that federal
financial regulatory agencies are to "encourage" lending institutions to
meet credit needs of their local communities,' 6 and requires the agencies to
issue regulations for this purpose. 17
In 1978, the appropriate federal agencies responded to the Congres-
sional mandate. '8 They adopted regulations requiring each financial insti-
tution to issue a statement identifying the community it serves and listing
types of credit available to that community. 19 Provided with this required
information, bank regulatory agencies will assess how well the institution
meets community credit needs, 20 and may deny an institution's application
15. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2905 (West Supp.
1978). The House version of the Housing and Community Development Act, H.R. 6655,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), did not originally contain a CRA title at all, but it was added by
the Conference Committee. The Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 634, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), which adopted the House bill as amended, H.R. REP. No. 236, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), passed the House on October 4, 1977. 123 CONG. REC. H 10564-70 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1977). The Senate passed the Conference Report on October 1, 1977. 123 CONG.
REC. S16112-20 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1977). The current law succeeds the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976) (amended 1977), which
replaced a large number of urban development programs, such as open space, urban re-
newal, and water and sewer facilities, with a single block grant program. See M. SLOANE,
supra note 7, at 149. The 1974 Act also significantly changed the low-rent public housing
and FHA mortgage insurance programs. See S. REP. No. 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, re-
printedin (1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4273, 4273. The 1977 Act extends authori-
zation for and amends the community block grant program, provides new contract money
for section 8 rental assistance and conventional public housing, increases the maximum loan
amounts for FHA-insured mortgages, and extends the Farmers' Home Administration's ru-
ral housing programs. S. REP. No. 95-175, supra note 10, at 2-4.
16. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(b) (West Supp. 1978).
The Act asserts as a congressional finding that financial institutions have a "continuing and
affirmative obligation" to help meet their local credit needs. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1978).
17. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2905 (West Supp. 1978).
18. The regulations represent a joint effort of the FRB, the FHLBB, the FDIC and the
Comptroller of the Currency. On January 25, February 21, and March 29, 1978, the agen-
cies announced in the Federal Register a series of hearings on the regulations. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 3370-72 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 7243-44 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 13074 (1978). Both oral and
written testimonies were taken in March 1978 and the proposed regulations were published
on July 11, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 29918-24 (1978). After voluminous written comments on the
proposals had been received and considered, the final regulations were adopted. 43 Fed.
Reg. 47144-5-5 (1978). All four sets of regulations are substantially the same, except for
minor procedural variations.
19. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4).
20. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7).
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for a charter, merger or branch office should its record prove inadequate.21
The Act and the regulations portend a developing banking policy that
requires banks to be responsive to both community credit and depository
needs. Significantly, the Act shifts the burden of enforcing this policy from
those affected by redlining abuses to the government. Nevertheless, be-
cause it fails to specifically outlaw redlining practices and to provide a
comprehensive legislative scheme for remedying redlining abuses, the
CRA seems likely to fall short of its ultimate goal. This Note will analyze
this thesis in light of two different approaches that have been used to com-
bat redlining in the past - civil rights statutes and the use of federal bank
regulation.
I. STRUGGLING AGAINST URBAN DISINVESTMENT: THE USE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AND BANK REGULATORY STATUTES
A. Civil Rights Statutes
In the absence of legislation specifically outlawing or regulating redlin-
ing, individuals and civil rights groups have argued that various civil rights
laws either explicitly or implicitly prohibit discriminatory lending prac-
tices, including redlining.
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (section 1982) states that
every United States citizen has the same right to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, or convey property, both real and personal.22 Before 1968, the
Supreme Court assumed that state action was a prerequisite to a claim
under section 1982.23 In Jones v. Alfred H Mayer Co. ,24 however, the
Supreme Court found that section 1982 bars both public and private racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of property. Despite this expansive
reading of the statute, the Court explicitly limited section 1982's applica-
tion to discrimination in property sales and rentals. 25 Discriminatory
financing practices, the Court noted, were covered instead by the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.26 Following Alfred H. Mayer, two lower courts held
that the sale of property to black purchasers at allegedly higher prices and
on less favorable terms than those available to whites stated a cause of
21. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154-44 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.8); Community
Reinvestment Act, § 804, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903 (West Supp. 1978).
22. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
23. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (private discrimination permitted by federal
district court contains sufficient state action for a claim under § 1982).
24. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
25. Id at 413.
26. Id For a discussion of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3619 (1976), see
notes 35-69 infra.
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action under section 1982.27 It does not appear, however, that any court
has ruled precisely on section 1982's applicability to redlining practices,
and it appears that such an expansion of the statute is unlikely 28 in light of
the Supreme Court's restrictive statutory interpretation in Alfred H. Mayer
and the availability of more appropriate civil rights legislation. 29
Another civil rights statute of limited applicability to redlining is Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30 Section 2000d of the Act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. 3' Because most mortgages
are not funded by the federal government and because federally insured
mortgages, including FHA and VA loans, are specifically excluded from
27. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F.2d 210 (N.D. I11. 1969), a f'don other
grounds sub norm. Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
821 (1970); Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974). In both cases, real estate companies had allegedly exploited existing racial
segregation and a resultant scarcity of black housing by imposing stricter terms in install-
ment contracts with black purchasers. In Contract Buyers, this purported exploitation was
achieved by giving mortgages based on falsely inflated appraisals of residential properties.
The real estate company ostensibly engaged also in "blockbusting," or scare tactics to en-
courage white residents to sell at low prices. 300 F. Supp. at 214. In Clark, the Seventh
Circuit coined the phrase "exploitation theory" to describe this type of liability under §
1982, and stated that such a violation would be found if "the facts demonstrate that defend-
ants exploited a situation created by socio-economic forces tainted by racial discrimination."
501 F.2d at 330. The court, however, required only a showing that the sellers had intention-
ally encouraged racial segregation by exploitation rather than a showing of actual sales to
whites on more favorable terms. Id But see Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613
(5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973), in which the court rejected the exploita-
tion rationale and held that a violation of § 1982 requires a showing that defendants them-
selves actually discriminated against blacks by selling homes to them on less favorable terms
than on those to which they sold homes to whites. Id. at 616. The exploitation theory has
not gained wide acceptance and has not been the subject of Supreme Court review.
28. But see Renne, supra note 1, at 998-99. The author argues that the exploitation
theory (see note 27 supra) might be useful in instances where banks discriminate in residen-
tial financing based on a neighborhood's racial composition or geographic location. See
also Comment, supra note 1, at 489-93. Even if this theory were accepted in redlining cases,
however, § 1982 could be invoked only when the redlining was alleged to have racially
discriminatory effects. See Comment, Redlining and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975, 25 EMORY L.J. 667, 680 (1976). See also Note, Redlining: Remediesfor Victims of
Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 86-87 (1976).
29. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 3601 to 3619 (1976) makes illegal, inter alia,
discrimination in the sale, rental or financing of housing. See id §§ 3604 to 3605; notes 35-
69 and accompanying text infra.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
31. Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)
states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
[Vol. 28:635
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coverage, 32 the provision's usefulness as a redlining remedy is limited.
Nevertheless, one federal district court has classified a building and loan
company's extension of home mortgage money as a federally assisted ac-
tivity, whether or not the loan is, in fact, federally insured.33 Although the
court did not explain its reasons for viewing extension of home mortgage
loans as a federally assisted activity, its decision was likely based on the
federal government's substantial involvement in the home mortgage mar-
ket above and beyond insuring or guaranteeing loans made by private
lenders.34 Since this theory has not been accepted by any other court,
however, it is unlikely that a redlining suit premised on Title VI grounds
could prevail.
The civil rights statute most applicable to redlining is Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, more commonly referred to as the Fair Housing
Act. 35 Sections 804 and 805 of the Act prohibit discrimination in the sale,
rental, or financing of housing.36 Early cases brought under these provi-
32. Section 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) specifically excludes contracts of insurance
or guaranty from coverage.
33. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 499 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In
Laufman, potential homebuyers, excluded from participation in a building and loan com-
pany's home mortgage financing program, claimed that systematic denial of loan applica-
tions in interracial neighborhoods violated § 2000d as well as the Fair Housing Act. Id at
491. The court denied the company's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs
had stated a cause of action under § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and under §§ 804,
805 and 817 of the Fair Housing Act. Id at 501. For a discussion of the Fair Housing Act
claims raised in this case, see notes 38-44 and accompanying text infra.
34. See note 11 supra. The Act's legislative history suggests a deliberate attempt to
exempt private lending institutions from the coverage of § 2000d through the exclusion of
contracts of insurance or guaranty. See note 32 and accompanying text supra. Neverthe-
less, one commentator has argued that loan advances which the federal government makes
to banks, particularly under the Federal Home Loan Bank System, are not contracts of
insurance or guaranty, but are direct financial assistance, thus subjecting the banks to Title
VI's coverage. See Searing, supra note 11, at 1124.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3619 (1976).
36. Section 804 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976) makes it unlawful
because of a person's race, color, religion, sex or national origin a) to refuse to sell or rent
after making an offer, to refuse to negotiate, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny a
dwelling; b) to discriminate in the terms, conditions or privileges of a sale or rental, or in the
provision of services; c) to make, print, or publish any notice, statement or advertisement
that indicates any discriminatory preference with respect to a sale or rental; d) to represent
that a dwelling is not available for sale or rental, when in fact it is available; or e) to induce
or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent a dwelling by statements concerning the
prevalence of a particular race, color, religion, sex or national origin in the neighborhood.
Section 805 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976), makes it unlawful for a
bank, building and loan association, insurance company, or other business making commer-
cial real estate loans to deny a loan or other financial assistance or to discriminate in the
amount, interest rate, duration or other loan conditions because of the race, color, religion,
sex or national origin of the applicant, or any person associated with the applicant in con-
19791
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sions dealt with racially discriminatory practices, including "blockbusting"
and advertising a preference for white tenants or buyers.37 Recently, how-
ever, one district court ruled that racially oriented redlining is a discrimi-
natory lending practice explicitly prohibited by sections 804 and 805. In
Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 38 potential homebuyers, ex-
cluded from a building and loan company's home mortgage financing pro-
gram, alleged that the company's practice of denying loan applications in
certain interracial neighborhoods violated both sections 804 and 805 of the
Act.39 The court denied the company's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under both provi-
sions.4° In so ruling, the court extensively reviewed the discriminatory
sales and lending provisions of the Fair Housing Act to determine their
applicability to redlining.
The court first found that denial of financial assistance for home
purchase would "make unavailable or deny" a "dwelling" within the
meaning of section 804.4 1 Furthermore, a denial shown to be based on
nection with the loan, or to discriminate because of the purposes of the loan, or because of
the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants or occupants of the dwelling for which the
loan is to be made.
37. "Blockbusting" has been defined as "the practice of inducing the sale of homes
through representations that persons of a particular race or color were entering or about to
enter the neighborhood." Comment, supra note I, at 476. See, e.g., Brown v. State Realty
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (statements made by real estate agents to white
property owners that neighborhood was "going colored" fell within statutory proscription of
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976) (blockbusting provision) despite absence of evidence of excessive
profiteering by agents); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969) (repeated
representations that neighborhood was changing made by real estate agent to induce listing
contracts and sales violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976)). See also United States v. Hunter,
324 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971), af'd, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972) (newspaper which placed advertisements indicating a preference for white tenants
violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1976), but no injunction granted because no pattern of such
discrimination shown).
38. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
39. Id at 491.
40. Id The court also found that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under § 2000d
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id See notes 33-34 and accompanying text
supra. Additionally, the court found that plaintiffs had a valid claim under § 817 of the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976), which provides that "it shall be unlawful to . . .
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exer-
cised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section . . . 3604, 3605 . . . of
this title."
41. 408 F. Supp. at 493. This section, as interpreted by the court, generally encompasses
transactions involving sales or rentals. Since the court found that financing is an integral
part of the sales transaction, denial of financing because of racial considerations is a viola-
tion of § 804. Thus the court, in viewing §§ 804 and 805 collaterally, found that discrimina-
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racial considerations would violate the Act.42 Secondly, the court inter-
preted section 805, prohibiting loan denials based on racial factors, 43 as an
explicit prohibition of redlining. Thus, it deemed illegal loan availability
based on the racial composition of a specific geographic area.44
In line with Laufman, Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., also
condemns discriminatory lending practices.45 In Harrison, two white
homebuyers attempting to purchase a home in an integrated neighborhood
alleged that the only mortgage loan terms available to them were less
favorable than would have been available for a purchase in an all-white
area.46 In denying the mortgage company's motion to dismiss, the court
held that to state a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff
need demonstrate that racial considerations alone resulted in denial of
housing or loan terms. It is not necessary to demonstrate discrimination
on the basis of a plaintiffs own race.47 The decision not only buttresses
Laufman's holding that Title VIII explicitly prohibits redlining, but also
makes clear that discrimination based on the redlined area's racial compo-
sition, rather than on the individual plaintiffs race, will support a cause of
action under the Fair Housing Act. 48
Both the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) have interpreted the Fair
tory transactions involving both the sale or rental of a dwelling and real estate loans came
within the purview of either provision. Id
42. Id
43. Section 805 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976). See note 36 supra.
The relevant language in 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976), according to the Laufman court, is the
prohibition of discrimination based on the race "of the present or prospective owners, les-
sees, tenants, or occupants of the dwelling or dwellings in relation to which such loan or
other financial assistance is to be made or given." 408 F. Supp. at 493.
44. Additionally, the Laufman court relied on interpretations of the Fair Housing Act
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. Both have interpreted the Act as prohibiting racially motivated redlining. 408 F.
Supp. at 494-95. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text infra. The court also discussed the
recently enacted Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), §§ 301 to 310, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801
to 2809 (1976). It found that the HMDA indicates "a grave concern with redlining" not
inconsistent with the court's finding that the Fair Housing Act earlier outlawed the practice.
408 F. Supp. at 498. For a discussion of the HMDA, see notes 71-78 and accompanying text
Mfra.
45. 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
46. Id. at 67.
47. Id The defendant had argued that the Fair Housing Act grants standing only to
those actually discriminated against because of their race, and not for discrimination based
on an area's racial composition. Id
48. Id Other cases brought under § 805 have involved foreclosure policies which alleg-
edly were harsher on black customers than on white customers. See, e.g., Hunter v. Atchi-
son, 466 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1972); Lindsey v. Modern Am. Mortgage Corp., 383 F. Supp. 293
(N.D. Tex. 1974).
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Housing Act to specifically prohibit redlining.49 A HUD report states that
outright refusals to lend, as well as onerous loan terms for areas of high
minority group concentration, are prohibited by Title VIII.50 Addition-
ally, the FHLBB has issued a regulation prohibiting discrimination in
lending based on the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of those
residing in the vicinity of the property for which the loan is requested. 5'
Redlining premised on the age of homes or on area income levels, rather
than on racial criteria, is not likely to come within the prohibitions of the
Fair Housing Act. Nevertheless, those redlining practices which are fair in
form are frequently discriminatory in operation and thus are susceptible to
attack under the discriminatory effects test enunciated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 52 In this employment discrimination case, the Supreme Court
held that regardless of an employer's motivation, use of employee selection
criteria excluding a disproportionate number of minorities violates section
703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,53 absent proof that the criteria rea-
sonably measure job performance, and, consequently, qualify as a "busi-
ness necessity."'54
Several courts have upheld application of the discriminatory effects test
in cases brought under the Fair Housing Act. In Williams v. Matthews,55 a
real estate company maintained a policy of selling lots to only certified
builders. Ostensibly the company's goal was to develop the area in a
49. HUD has the primary responsibility for administering the Fair Housing Act. 42
U.S.C. § 3608 (1976). See also note 44 supra.
50. See Private Lending Institutions Questionnaire, supra note 4. In Trafficante v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972), the Supreme Court held that HUD's inter-
pretations of the Fair Housing Act are entitled to great weight.
51. 12 C.F.R. § 528.2(a)(4) (1978). Since-the enactment of the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1691f (1976), and the Community Reinvestment Act, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 2901 to 2905 (West Supp. 1978), this regulation has been amended to prohibit
discrimination in lending based on the age or location of a dwelling. 43 Fed. Reg. 22332-39
(1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 528.2). Additionally, a FHLBB guideline states that the
racial composition of an area is always an improper underwriting criteria. 12 C.F.R. §
531.8(c)(6) (1978).
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The employer had made attainment of a high school diploma
or minimum intelligence test score a prerequisite to employment, although there was no
evidence that such factors were related to successful job performance. Id at 426.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
54. 401 U.S. at 432. Under a business necessity defense, a selection procedure which
"serves the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship" will be
permitted despite its discriminatory effect. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
422 (1975). If the defendant can meet this test, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show the
absence of less discriminatory selection criteria to adequately measure job capacity. Id at
425.
55. 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
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prompt and orderly fashion.56 This restrictive sales practice, however, dis-
proportionately excluded black real estate buyers. Finding that the policy
violated the Fair Housing Act, the Eighth Circuit ruled that such a policy
could be justified as a "business necessity" only if the seller could demon-
strate lack of an acceptable, less discriminatory alternative. 57 In United
States v. City of Black Jack,58 the same court invalidated a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting construction of multiple-family dwellings under section
817 of the Fair Housing Act59 because the ordinance effectively prevented
eighty-five percent of the metropolitan area's blacks from obtaining hous-
ing in Black Jack.60 The city had argued that the ordinance was necessary
to control traffic, school overcrowding, and devaluation of single-family
homes. The court did not deem these purposes to be sufficiently "compel-
ling" to overcome the presumption of illegality.6 1 Moreover in another
case, Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 6 2 black residents had been forced
to leave their Philadelphia neighborhood because construction of a low-
income public housing project was planned for the area. The Third Cir-
cuit found that the city's subsequent decision to cancel the project had a
discriminatory impact on blacks, as only white residents remained in the
area.63 Although the city had offered no justification for its decision, the
court ruled that the standard for applying the "business necessity" defense
under Title VIII should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 64
56. Id at 825.
57. Id at 828. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
58. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976). For the pertinent language of this section see note 40
supra.
60. 508 F.2d at 1186.
61. Id The court listed several factors determinative of whether the defendant had met
the compelling justification standard: whether in fact the ordinance furthers the governmen-
tal interest asserted; whether the public interest to be served is constitutionally permissible
and substantially outweighs the private detriment; and whether there are less drastic means
available to accomplish the government's purpose. Id at 1187. Accord, Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971) (to justify rezoning of an area selected for a housing project for a park and recreation
area, thus discriminating against minorities, the city must show a compelling government
interest).
62. 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
63. Id at 149.
64. Id at 148-49. The court specifically rejected the compelling interest test used by the
Eighth Circuit in City of Black Jack, and listed several factors to be weighed under a case-
by-case analysis. The justification must serve a legitimate and bona fide interest of the de-
fendant, and defendant must demonstrate that no less discriminatory course of action is
available to achieve that interest. Id at 148. See also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1977), in
which the court found that the village's failure to rezone to allow for construction of low-
income housing violated Title VIII under the discriminatory effects test, but remanded for a
1979]
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It does not appear that any cases have directly challenged redlining
practices under section 805 solely because of discriminatory effect. An
opinion letter of the FHLBB General Counsel, however, states that the
discriminatory effects test is directly applicable in the redlining context,
and that redlining practices having such discriminatory effects violate
other FHLBB regulations specifically forbidding discrimination in lend-
ing.65 To establish a prima facie case under the discriminatory effects test,
a plaintiff would compare the racial or ethnic population of the redlined
area with the racial or ethnic composition of the lending institution's effec-
tive lending territory.66 Assuming that a discriminatory effect could be
established, the defendant institution would then have to demonstrate a
business necessity for redlining. As demonstrated above, however, the
standard applied in Title VIII cases to establish a business necessity de-
fense varies from court to court and from case to case. Nevertheless, sev-
eral courts67 and the FHLBB General Counsel have indicated that a bank
should use the least discriminatory means of accomplishing its goal.68
Under such a test, it would be difficult for a lending institution to justify its
redlining practices, since a less discriminatory means of measuring
creditworthiness would always be to examine each applicant's financial
status and the specific property to be financed.69
determination of whether such effect was justifiable under the particular facts of this case.
The court would look to four factors to determine if discriminatory impact is justified: I)the
strength of plaintiffs showing of discriminatory effect; 2) some evidence of discriminatory
intent; 3) defendant's interest in taking the opposed action; and 4) whether plaintiff seeks to
compel affirmative action on the part of defendant to provide housing for minorities or
merely seeks to restrain defendant from interfering with individual property owners seeking
to provide such housing. 558 F.2d at 1290. But see Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d
1110, 1112-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975) (landlord's requirement that ten-
ants have a weekly income equal to 90% of monthly rental, which excluded almost all
public assistance recipients, held not violative of § 804, even though it had an adverse effect
on minorities).
65. 3 U.S. LEAGUE OF SAV. ASSN's FED. GUIDE U 13-49.2 at 8173-3D (1978). The
FHLBB has also issued a guideline stating that a refusal to grant a loan based on the age of
the home or the income level of the neighborhood may be discriminatory in effect, since
minority groups tend to live in older, less affluent areas. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(c)(6) (1978).
66. 3 U.S. LEAGUE OF SAV. ASSN's FED. GUIDE U 13-49.2 at 8173-7 (1978). This
opinion defines effective lending territory as the area in which an institution makes a sub-
stantial majority of its loans and all other areas which are as close to the institution's offices
as such areas. Id at 8173-7, n.2.
67. See notes 55-64 and accompanying text supra. Contrary to Title VIII standards, the
standard for establishing a business necessity defense under Title VIII is clearly enunciated
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1977). See note 54 and accompanying
text supra.
68. See notes 55-57 & 62-64 and accompanying text supra; 3 U.S. LEAGUE OF SAY.
AssN's FED. GUIDE U 13-49.2 at 8173-6.
69. See Comment, supra note I, at 481-82. See also Comment, Redlining. Why Make a
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Despite various judicial and administrative interpretations prohibiting
redlining, the Fair Housing Act and other civil rights statutes have been
invoked very sparingly to combat bank redlining policies. One reason for
the dearth of lawsuits is the difficulty plaintiffs face in meeting their initial
burden. Establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory intent or dis-
criminatory effect of a lending practice on minorities requires a vast com-
pilation of statistical data, involving significant expenditures of time and
money.70 Additionally, to challenge redlining under the Fair Housing Act,
a plaintiff must allege either an intent to discriminate on the basis of race
or a racially discriminatory effect. Hence, the civil rights statutes will not
apply to lower income white residents whose neighborhoods might be red-
lined because of the age of their homes or area income levels, rather than
the area's racial composition.
B. Bank Regulatory Statutes
Partly because of the difficulties in using civil rights statutes to eliminate
discriminatory lending practices on a case by case basis, Congress has en-
acted bank regulatory statutes designed to eliminate and prevent discrimi-
natory practices, including redlining, on an industry-wide level through
administrative regulation. These regulatory statutes have been rather un-
successful, however, largely due to both minimally effective enforcement
efforts and mechanisms.
One such statute directly resulting from concern over redlining is the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA). 7' The purpose of the
Federal Case Out of t 6GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 813, 839-42 (1976). The FHLBB Gen-
eral Counsel has stated that "[i]t is highly unlikely that any legitimate business purpose
could be served by the practice of redlining. . . which cannot be achieved by non-discrimi-
natory, or less discriminatory means." 3 U.S. LEAGUE OF SAV. ASSN'S FED. GUIDE I U 13-
49.2 at 8173-6 (1978).
70. The Fair Housing Act provides for a private cause of action when a single instance
of a discriminatory housing practice is alleged. Fair Housing Act, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612
(1976). Additionally, the Attorney General may institute an action when there is reasonable
cause to believe that a "pattern or practice" of racial discrimination is involved. Id at § 813,
42 U.S.C. at § 3613. Regardless, however, of whether the suit is brought by an individual, a
group of individuals, or the government, it is necessary to present statistical data to show the
existence or discriminatory effects of a lender's discriminatory redlining policies. See Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 483-86.
. 71. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801 to 2809 (1976). The statute asserts as a congressional finding that
deposit institutions have sometimes contributed to urban decay by failing to provide ade-
quate home financing to qualified individuals. Id § 2801(a).
Historically, redlining primarily affected racial minorities and lower income residents. In-
creasingly, as more professionals and persons of middle income return to city dwelling, the
practice has begun to affect these other groups as well. Consumer groups affected by redlin-
ing conducted extensive studies on this effect. See Note, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
of"1975, 12 NEW ENG. L. REv. 957, 974 n.75 (1977) (citing Los ANGELES CENTER FOR NEW
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HMDA is to ensure that banks provide sufficient information to citizens
and public officials who can then determine whether the banks are actually
serving the borrowing needs of their communities.72 Consequently, the
Act requires most lending institutions73 to disclose to the public the
number and dollar amounts of the home mortgage loans they grant.74 The
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has issued implementing regulations to clar-
ify and elaborate on the HMDA provisions, 75 but compliance with the Act
CORPORATE PRIORITIES, WHERE THE MONEY IS: MORTGAGE LENDING, Los ANGELES
COUNTY (1975); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, M. ANGE-
LASTO, GEOGRAPHICAL DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING; NATIONAL URBAN
LEAGUE, WHERE THE LENDER LOOKS FIRST: A CASE STUDY OF MORTGAGE DISINVEST-
MENT IN BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK (1960-1970). The HMDA is the result of demands
made by these groups that financial institutions be required to disclose information on
where they are making loans.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b) (1976). Additionally, some state and local governments have
taken anti-redlining action. See Note, supra note 71, at 977 nn. 88 & 89 (citing: CHICAGO,
ILL. CODE, ch. 7 §§ 7-30 to 40 as amended June 26, 1974; California Savings and Loan
Comm'n, Title 10 Subchapter 20 (1976); Office of the Comm'r of Banks, Mass. Disclosure
Directive (Aug. 1, 1975)). At least two state statutes have been challenged on the ground
that they were preempted by the HMDA. In Glen Ellyn Savings and Loan Ass'n v.
Tsoumas, 377 N.E.2d I (111. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978), the
court ruled that the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was intended to preempt application of
state anti-redlining statutes to federally chartered banks and savings and loan associations.
Accordingly, the court struck down the Illinois law. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 95, § 201 (Smith-
Hurd) (1976 Supp.). 377 N.E.2d at 2. In a similar case, the New Jersey anti-redlining stat-
ute which requires disclosure and prohibits redlining was challenged. National State Bank
v. Long, No. 77-2168 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 1979). The United States District Court for New Jersey
held that although HMDA preempts the state disclosure law as it applies to national banks,
it does not prohibit states from enacting anti-redlining statutes. Hence, national banks are
still subject to the state's prohibition of redlining. Id. at 18
73. HMDA requirements are limited to lending institutions with total assets in excess of
$10 million and a home or branch office within a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
(SMSA). 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1) (1976). An SMSA is a county or group of contiguous
counties which contain at least one city of 50,000, or twin cities with a combined population
of at least 50,000. See Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures, reproduced
in R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT 99 n.4 (1978).
74. This information must be made publicly available at the home office and at one
branch office within each SMSA. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(I) (1976). Disclosure must be made
as to the following: the number and total dollar amounts of mortgage loans originated or
purchased within each fiscal year, id; the number and dollar amounts of such loans by
census tracts both within and without the SMSA, id at § 2803(a)(2)(A) & (B); the number
and dollar amounts of federally insured loans, id at § 2803(b)(1); the number and dollar
amounts of loans made to mortgagors who did not intend to reside in the secured property,
id at § 2803(b)(2); and the number and dollar amounts of home improvement loans, id. at §
2803(b)(3). Federally insured loans include FHA loans insured under Title II of the Na-
tional Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707 to 1752z (1976), Farmers Home Administration loans
under Title V of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1471 to 1490 (1976), and guaranteed
VA loans, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1827 (1976).
75. Known collectively as Regulation C, these regulations: I) provide that any deposi-
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is enforced by the appropriate supervisory agency. 76
Since the HMDA does not require that depository institutions disclose
information on denial of loans or standards used in processing loan appli-
cations, the public cannot fully determine whether an institution is ade-
qutely meeting local credit needs. Additionally, because nothing more
than disclosure is required by the Act, only public pressure can be ex-
pected to effect change in a bank's lending policy.77 Although it is clear
that the HMDA is inadequate to meet the redlining problem, the informa-
tion disclosed under the Act could prove useful in establishing a prima
facie case of racially discriminatory effect under the Fair Housing Act.78
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)79 also seeks to eliminate
discriminatory lending practices. The ECOA prohibits discrimination
against a loan applicant on the basis of race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, sex, marital status, age, income derived from public assistance pro-
grams, or the exercise of rights under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act.80 Under the ECOA, a creditor taking adverse action on an applica-
tion must supply reasons for the decision, if requested. 8' Additionally,
tory institution with less than $10 million in total assets is exempt from the HMDA, 12
C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(1) (1978); 2) require that each depository institution compile its mortgage
loan data for each fiscal year, and provide separate data for each SMSA in which it has a
home or branch office, 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(1) (1978); 3) set out the dates by which disclo-
sures are to be made to the public, 12 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1978); 4) establish that a majority-
owned, depository subsidiary of a depository institution shall be treated as a separate entity
for disclosure purposes, 12 C.F.R. § 203.001 (1978); and 5) set out disclosure requirements
for previously exempt depository institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 203.002 (1978).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 2804(b) & (c) (1976). Existing statutory authority for such enforcement
includes the following: the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1976); the
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, § 5(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1976); the National Housing
Act, § 407, 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1976); the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, §§ 6(i), 17, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1426(i), 1437 (1976); and the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (1976). See
note 12 supra; Comment, supra note 24, at 692-93.
77. Some commentators argue that the burden of combating and enforcing redlining
should be on the federal government, and not on the individuals affected by these practices.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 7 1, at 984-86.
78. See notes 52-69 and accompanying text supra.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1691f (1976). The ECOA applies to all creditors, including
those who regularly extend credit, those who arrange for the extension of credit, and assign-
ees of the original creditor, when that assignee participates in the decision to continue, renew
or extend credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) (1976).
80. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)-(3) (1976). The ECOA was
added as Title VII of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1601 to 1681t (1976).
Originally, the ECOA was designed to combat credit discrimination based on sex and mari-
tal status; its coverage was expanded in the 1976 amendments. See Note, Consumer Credit
Protection - The Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 388, 388
(1977).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) (1976). The creditor may fulfill this obligation by providing
the reasons in writing, or by advising the applicant in writing that he or she may request a
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under regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to enforce
the Act, creditors must retain loan applications for a period of twenty-five
months after decisions are made. 82 These regulations also spell out certain
criteria which must be excluded in evaluating a loan application. Most
relevant to redlining, when processing an application for mortgage money,
a lender may not consider the racial or ethnic character of the neighbor-
hood in which the property is located.83 The Act also provides a private
cause of action for actual damages sustained by an applicant, either indi-
vidually or as a member of a class, because of the creditor's failure to com-
ply with ECOA requirements. 84 Compelling compliance with ECOA
requirements is the statutorily mandated duty of the financial supervisory
agencies. 85
By requiring retention of all loan applications, the ECOA and its regula-
tions fill one of the gaps in the HMDA disclosure system. 86 Retention of
this information, combined with that which must be disclosed under
HMDA, will enable individuals, groups, or federal agencies to determine
whether a financial institution is actually meeting community credit needs.
Such information should also be adequate to establish a prima facie case
of discriminatory effect under either the ECOA or the Fair Housing Act.87
Indeed, the legislative history makes clear that Congress intended that the
standards established in Title VII cases, particularly in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. ,88 should be applied in suits brought under the ECOA.89 Addi-
tionally, since the ECOA specifically allows use of class action suits, 90 a
large number of citizens may be able to share the expense of such a law-
suit. Nonetheless, attempts to eliminate redlining through litigation under
the ECOA will probably meet the same problems as those occurring in
Fair Housing Act suits - presenting sufficient proof and rebutting a busi-
ness necessity defense.9'
statement of reasons. Id Notifications of adverse actions must be retained by the creditor
for twenty-five months. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b) (1978).
82. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b) (1978).
83. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(z) n.3 (1978).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1976).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c (1976).
86. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
98. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
89. See S. REP. No 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 403, 406. These standards are particularly relevant in questions of
burdens of proof. Id
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1976).
91. See notes 55-69 and accompanying text supra. To date, it does not appear that any
suits attacking redlining have been brought under ECOA.
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Neither the civil rights statutes, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act nor their accompanying regulations have
provided a satisfactory solution to the redlining problem. The civil rights
approach, while potentially useful in attacking racial redlining, places the
burden of enforcement on individual victims and civil rights advocates.
The ECOA, which provides for a combination of administrative and judi-
cial enforcement, still is limited to racial redlining. The HMDA, on the
other hand, while broadening the scope of the redlining attack to include
discrimination based on the age or income levels of a neighborhood, pro-
vides for no enforcement at all and relies solely upon public pressure. The
Community Reinvestment Act of 197792 represents one further step in the
attempt to control redlining by placing the enforcement burden primarily
on financial regulatory agencies and forcing lending institutions to demon-
strate their efforts to serve community credit needs.
II. THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT REGULATIONS
Intended to pressure lending institutions to meet their affirmative obli-
gation to serve their local communities, 93 the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) was introduced by Senator William Proxmire as part of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977. 94 To accomplish this
purpose, the federal financial supervisory agencies95 must assess each
lender's record of meeting its entire community's credit needs and consider
this record when evaluating the financial institution's application for a de-
92. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901 to 2905 (West Supp. 1978).
93. In the Senate Report on the Community Reinvestment Act, the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs stated that under then existing law lending institutions
had a primary responsibility to service their local communities. The Committee found that
the CRA was necessary because the bank regulatory agencies had no affirmative programs
to encourage lenders to give first priority to local credit needs. S. REP. No. 95-175, supra
note 10, at 307. In its Report, the Committee also stated its dissatisfaction that only one
federal bank regulatory agency, the FHLBB, had instituted an anti-redlining program. Id
This statement was made in reference to the FHLBB's regulations under the Fair Housing
Act, in which the agency interprets the Act as prohibiting redlining. See note 51 and accom-
panying text supra. For the legislative history of the CRA, see note 15 supra.
The Act provides that regulated financial institutions must demonstrate that their offices
serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to operate,
that they must provide for both credit and deposit needs, and that they have a "continuing
and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs" of their local communities. Com-
munity Reinvestment Act, § 802(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a) (West Supp. 1978).
94. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301 to 5317 (1976). Senator Proxmire (D - Wisconsin and Chairper-
son of the Committee on Housing, Banking and Urban Affairs) also introduced the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act.
95. The agencies obligated to enforce CRA are listed in note 11 supra.
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posit facility.96
Accordingly, the Act required each financial supervisory agency to issue
regulations to implement the CRA.97 The regulations spell out in detail
the means by which the agencies will encourage and determine a lending
institution's effort and success in meeting community credit needs. Al-
though each agency promulgated separate regulations, the provisions are
identical except for procedural variations. Since the FHLBB regulates
savings and loan associations, which grant more home mortgage loans
than other lending institutions, 98 the FHLBB regulations will be used to
illustrate the general requirements of all the regulations.
The regulations require each financial institution to adopt a Community
Reinvestment Act Statement delineating its local community. 99 This de-
lineation may be determined by reference to existing political or govern-
mental boundaries, I° ° the institution's effective lending territory,' 0 or by
96. Community Reinvestment Act, § 804, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903 (West Supp. 1978). For
the purposes of the CRA, the term "application for a deposit facility" encompasses requests
for approval of: a national bank charter or charter for a federal savings and loan associa-
tion; deposit insurance for a state bank, a savings bank, or a savings and loan association;
establishment of a branch depository office; the relocation of a home or branch office; or a
merger, consolidation, or acquisition of assets of another financial institution regulated
under the Bank Holding Company Act or the National Housing Act. See Community Rein-
vestment Act, § 803(3), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2902(3) (West Supp. 1978).
Each agency must also report to Congress each year on the actions it has taken to accom-
plish the purposes of the CRA. See Community Reinvestment Act, § 805, 12 U.S.C.A. §
2904 (West Supp. 1978).
97. Community Reinvestment Act, § 806, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2905 (West Supp. 1978). The
final version of the regulations appeared in the Federal Register on October 12, 1978, and
can be found as follows: Comptroller of the Currency, 43 Fed. Reg. 47146-68 (1978) (to be
codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.1 to 25.8, 25.101); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board, 43 Fed. Reg. 47148-51 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.1 to 228.8, 228.100);
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 43 Fed. Reg. 47151-53 (1978) (to be codified in 12
C.F.R. §§ 345.1 to 345.8, 345.101 to 345.102); Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 43 Fed. Reg.
47153-55 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 563e.1 to 563e.8).
98. See National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., Patterns and
Practices of Discrimination in Oakland, California 1 (1972). See also Renne, supra note 1,
at 993 n.29.
99. 43 Fed Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4). The Board of
Directors of each institution is to adopt the Statement within 90 days of the effective date of
the regulations. Id The local community is defined as "the contiguous areas surrounding
each office or group of offices, including any low and moderate income neighborhoods in
those areas." 43 Fed. Reg. 47153 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)). The
agencies have agreed, at least for the present, to use the HUD definition of "low and moder-
ate income" to determine which neighborhoods fall into this category. HUD's definition
encompasses those families whose income is 80% or less of the median income of an area,
after adjustments are made for family size. See R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at
40.
100. 43 Fed. Reg. 47153 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)(l)). SMSA (see
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any other reasonable means.l0 2 The Statement must also include a list of
specific types of credit which the institution provides, 0 3 and a copy of its
"CRA Notice" advising the public of the Act's coverage.' °4 To assess
whether the institution has met the credit needs of its entire community,
the Board will consider any CRA Statement, signed comments retained by
the institution or agency, and other relevant factors. '05 The Board will use
note 73 supra) or county lines may be used for this delineation. If the institution operates in
more than one SMSA or county, it must delineate each community, but only one Statement
is necessary. See R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at 38.
101. 43 Fed. Reg. 47153 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)(2)). The effective
lending territory is defined as the "local area or areas around each office or group of offices
where it makes a substantial portion of its loans and all other areas equidistant from its
offices as those areas." Id The regulation does not specify what constitutes a "substantial
portion" of the institution's loans. Additionally, it should be noted that this territory is
based on loans, not deposits. See R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at 38-39.
102. 43 Fed. Reg. 47153 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.3(b)(3)). Such means
must meet the purposes of CRA and may not exclude any low and moderate income areas.
Id Regardless of the method used to delineate the local community, maps must be used for
illustration in the Statement. 43 Fed. Reg. 47153 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
563e.3).
103. The categories which may be covered under this list include, for example, residen-
tial loans for one to four family dwelling units, residential loans for five or more family
dwelling units, housing rehabilitation loans, home improvement loans, small business loans,
farm loans, community development loans, commercial loans, and consumer loans. 43 Fed.
Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(b)(2)).
104. The CRA notice must also be displayed in the lobby of each of the institution's
offices. The notice, which is designed to encourage public involvement, states that CRA
requires the FHLBB to evaluate the financial institution's record and that the public may
submit comments, and may look at comment files, CRA statements, and FHLBB announce-
ments of applications covered by CRA. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12
C.F.R. § 563e.6). Institutions are encouraged to include in the CRA statement information
on particular efforts they have made to meet community credit needs. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154
(1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(c)). Optional statements may include:. a descrip-
tion of how special credit programs help to meet the credit needs of the community; a peri-
odic report outlining the institution's record of helping to meet local credit needs; and a
description of communication efforts with members of the community and other efforts to
determine area credit needs. Id The CRA statement must be made available for public
inspection, and must be reviewed and updated annually by the board of directors. 43 Fed.
Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.4(d) & (e)). In addition, each institu-
tion must maintain a file containing any signed written comments concerning the CRA
statement or the institution's performance in meeting community credit needs, responses
made by the institution to such comments, and any CRA statements in effect for the past two
years. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.5(a)).
105. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7). Other relevant
factors include an institution's attempts to ascertain local credit needs, its attempts to inform
the local community of its credit services, the geographic breakdown of its loan applications
and denials, evidence of discriminatory credit practices, and the institution's participation in
community development and governmentally insured loan programs. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154
(1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7(a) to (j)).
The four bank regulatory agencies have collectively formulated the Community Reinvest-
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the CRA assessment in determining whether to grant an institution's appli-
cation for a charter, branch office or other change in status. The applica-
tion of an institution assessed to be inadequately meeting credit needs may
be denied by the Board.' °6
In the first case to arise under the Act, a community group challenged a
merger application before the Federal Reserve Board on the ground that
the merger would not serve the "convenience and needs" of a nearby low
to moderate income area.107 Although the merger was approved prior to
the effective date of the regulations, 0 8 the Board's decision did take into
account the general policies of the CRA, and thus provides some insight
into the approach agencies might take in enforcing the Act. Commerce
Bancshares, Inc., a bank holding company, applied for a merger with the
Manchester Financial Corporation, another bank holding company. In
accordance with the Bank Holding Company Act, 10 9 the Board received
ment Act Examination Procedures. This procedures statement requires CRA review to be
integrated into existing examination procedures, although each agency may adopt its own
reporting method. See Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures, reprinted in
R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at 91 & n.2. The procedures statement emphasizes
that CRA review should not be made with inflexible rules, but rather should contemplate "a
judgmental evaluation of a lender's record." Id at 92, 94. Further, the procedures stress
that the Act was not intended to force lenders to make high risk loans. Id. at 92. Rather, the
examiner who finds an institution's CRA record lacking should "encourage" the lender to
improve its attempts to meet credit needs through informal discussions. Id at 95. Technical
compliance with the regulations, and communication with members of the community to
determine credit needs is emphasized. Id at 96-97. The examiner will prepare a narrative
statement indicating the reasonableness of community delineation, an evaluation of assess-
ment factors, the existence of any noncompliance and the corrective actions taken. The
examiner will then assign the institution a rating of I to 5 based on its overall CRA perform-
ance. Id at 117-18.
106. 43 Fed. Reg. 47154-55 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 563e.8). The Board may
consider the views of a state-chartered bank's state supervisory authority as to the appli-
cant's record of meeting community credit needs. In addition, in an application of a savings
and loan holding company, the Board may consider the credit needs of any subsidiary's
community. Id. at 47155. For a complete list of applications which may be denied on the
basis of a CRA assessment, see note 96 supra.
The CRA has prompted the four financial supervisory agencies to issue rules changing
application procedures to allow for more public notice and input into the process. See gener-
all, 43 Fed. Reg. 47156-62 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 5.2) (detailing conforming
amendments pursuant to the agencies' rule changes). Additionally, three agencies have spe-
cifically exempted from CRA requirements those institutions which operate as correspon-
dent banks, trust companies, or clearing agencies, since such institutions neither perform
commercial or retail banking services nor extend credit to the public. See 43 Fed. Reg.
47148 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 25.101), 43 Fed. Reg. 47150-51 (1978) (to be
codified in 12 C.F.R. § 228.100), 43 Fed. Reg. 47152 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
345.101).
107. Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 576 (1978).
108. Id. at 579 n.9.
109. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 to 1850 (1976).
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comment" 0 from, among others, the Manchester-Tower Grove Commu-
nity Organization, an affiliate of the Missouri Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). At a hearing to determine
whether the merger would serve the convenience and needs of the relevant
community, ACORN testified that the merger would not serve the
Manchester-Tower Grove neighborhood. In particular, ACORN con-
tended that the low to moderate income neighborhood had been inade-
quately served by the applicant's subsidiaries in terms of home mortgages,
home improvement loans and small business credit, areas which are
particularly stressed under CRA regulations."'~ Apparently, however,
ACORN failed to establish at the hearing that any such loans had actually
been denied. The Board concluded that the applicant's subsidiaries in the
St. Louis area had adequately served, and upon merger would most likely
continue to serve, the convenience and needs of their entire market, in-
cluding low to moderate income neighborhoods. 1 2 The applicant's sub-
sidiaries had concentrated their lending in commercial and industrial
credit areas. The Board found this emphasis on commercial loans not in-
consistent with the goal of meeting the convenience and needs of the area,
even though it resulted in Bancshares making fewer housing and consumer
loans." 3 Accordingly, the Board found that it should not require an appli-
cant to allocate a certain proportion of its funds to a particular credit need,
borrower or neighborhood. 14
The ACORN decision has sparked vigorous protest by congressional
supporters of the CRA. In a letter to Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Miller urging reconsideration of the decision, Senator Proxmire wrote that
the Board had totally misinterpreted the "affirmative obligations princi-
ple" of the CRA.1 5 Proxmire described this obligation as requiring "ag-
gressive and affirmative lending efforts to provide housing and small
business loans in the local community, with particular emphasis on low
and moderate income neighborhoods." 16 Although ,4CORN is currently
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1976).
11I. 64 Fed. Res. Bull. at 577. See 47 Fed. Reg. 47154 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
§ 563e.4(b)(2) (listing all criteria required in a CRA statement).
112. 64 Fed. Res. Bull. at 578.
113. Id at 579-80. The Board, however, extensively considered Bancshares' housing-
related credit programs and support of community development projects, which included
low to moderate income areas, and found its involvement sufficient. Id at 580-81.
114. Id at 579. The Board found relevant the fact that the Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 to 1850 (1976), requires the Board to consider an applicant's record for
meeting community credit needs, but does not require that the Board dictate a bank's prod-
uct mix - the credit or deposit services a bank should emphasize. Id
115. See R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at 26-27.
116. Id
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on appeal," 7 it indicates that at least the Federal Reserve Board does not
intend to require institutions to meet all types of community credit needs
in order to comply with CRA.
While the CRA does emphatically state that lending institutions have an
affirmative obligation to meet local credit needs, A CORN indicates that
the extent of this responsibility is unclear. Conversely, although the Act
fails to make redlining illegal, it does provide minimum sanctions for lend-
ers who do not attempt to meet local credit needs. To understand these
apparent incongruities in the CRA, the new law and regulations must be
assessed in light of the competing interests Congress had to accomodate in
attempting to develop a comprehensive redlining enforcement scheme -
those of financial institutions, those of consumer and civil rights groups,
and those of the financial regulatory agencies.
III. THE CRA STANDARD: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE AN
AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION TO HELP MEET COMMUNITY
CREDIT NEEDS
Although the Community Reinvestment Act is an attempt to restrict
redlining practices, it fails to establish a comprehensive legislative scheme
for remedying such abuses. While the legislative history clearly indicates
that Congress was concerned with redlining, I8 neither the Act nor the reg-
ulations specifically address this issue or declare such practices illegal." 9
Rather, the Act and the regulations merely stress the affirmative obligation
of lending institutions to service their local areas.120 Although a congres-
sional declaration of this responsibility is significant, such a statement is
alone inadequate to remedy redlining problems. Further, although the Act
requires agency assessment of the extent to which lending institutions are
meeting local credit needs' 2' and provides limited sanctions for failure to
117. Manchester-Tower Grove Community Organization (ACORN) v. Federal Reserve
Bd. of Governors, No. 78-1898 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 12, 1978).
118. See S. REP. No. 95-175, supra note 10, at 33.
119. To the extent that CRA attempts to pressure financial institutions into meeting com-
munity credit needs, without actually determining the legality of redlining, it is very similar
to the HMDA. In the CRA Examination Procedures issued by the agencies, a "judgmental
process" and "balanced viewpoint" are stressed. See R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note
73, at 94-95. See also note 105 supra. Hence, no particular action on the part of an institu-
tion will determine a failure per se to meet community credit needs. In fact, an institution's
redlining policies could be outweighed by its other lending policies or its community in-
volvement.
120. Community Reinvestment Act § 802(a)(3), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(a)(3) (West Supp.
1978).
121. Community Reinvestment Act § 804, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903 (West Supp. 1978).
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meet them, 122 it does not provide a unified administrative and enforcement
scheme. Similar to previous attempts to deal with redlining abuse, the
CRA is a piecemeal approach to a complex problem.
In enacting the CRA and formulating the regulations, Congress and the
four regulatory agencies attempted to strike a compromise between the in-
terests of civil rights and consumer groups on the one hand, and financial
institutions on the other. While the former groups wanted a comprehen-
sive anti-redlining statute, 23 the banks opposed any federal regulation ei-
ther mandating undesirable investments or imposing unwieldy
requirements. 24 Unfortunately, Congress' attempt to accommodate these
conflicting interests resulted in a lukewarm scheme increasing the banks'
responsibilities without providing an effective remedy for redlining abuses.
Had Congress truly intended to enact comprehensive anti-redlining leg-
islation, it could have done so without forcing lenders to make unduly
risky loans. Since redlining is, in essence, an over-generalization of the
creditworthiness of a given class of properties or borrowers, usually distin-
guished by their location in a certain geographical area, 25 the practice
could be eliminated simply by prohibiting banks from making such over-
generalizations. In practice, this would merely require banks to give full
consideration to each and every application for mortgage money. Banks
should be required to independently investigate the creditworthiness of
122. Id at § 2903(2). Indeed, there are no sanctions available under the Act against
financial institutions which have not applied for a deposit facility. See note 96 supra.
123. See Center for Community Change, Citizens' Regulatory Guidelines (July 1I, 1978)
(unpublished comments submitted to the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to proposed CRA
regulations by 32 public interest, housing, and consumer organizations). The obvious inter-
est of these organizations is that city neighborhoods, in their battle against urban blight,
should be able to obtain adequate home financing. These groups suggested that the agencies
be permitted under CRA to resort to legal sanctions available to them under their chartering
statutes, such as their cease and desist powers, and their ability to remove bank officials and
directors who violate banking laws and regulations. Id at 32. For a listing of such statutory
authorities, see note 76 supra.
124. Comment letters sent to the various agencies by lending institutions pursuant to the
proposed CRA regulations include: letter of B.F. Mizell, Jr., President, Guaranty Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Gainesville, Gainesville, Florida (July 21, 1978) (banks are
not eleemosynary institutions); letter of David E. Keller, Vice President, The State National
Bank, Big Spring, Texas (July 18, 1978) (CRA will lead to credit allocation, which is con-
trary to the free enterprise system); letter of Joe Kirkpatrick, Vice President, Dove Creek
State Bank, Dove Creek, Colorado (July 19, 1978) (CRA might encourage those who are
uncreditworthy to believe that they have a legal right to receive credit); letter of Alan L.
Lord, President, Cache National Bank, Greeley, Colorado (July 17, 1978) (agrees with goals
of CRA, but requests that no additional paperwork be required of lending institutions). See
also S. REP. No. 95-175, supra note 10, at 81-85. These views of Senators Morgan, Tower,
Garn, Lugar & Schmitt explicate many of the banking industry's concerns.
125. See notes 1-6 and accompanying text supra.
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each prospective borrower as well as each piece of realty to be mortgaged.
Applications which have been denied should be accompanied by a written
explanation of the action and on request, the bank should be required to
justify a particular mortgage loan denial vis-a-vis loans granted by the
bank in nearby communities.' 26 If a bank fails to comply with these pro-
cedures, or if a particular loan denial appears to be inadequately sup-
ported by evidence of relative unprofitability, a private cause of action
should be available to the victim. 127
This approach would utilize the most effective features of the civil rights
laws, particularly the delineation of specifically prohibited activities, and
the provision of adequate remedies for violations. Indeed, such a proposal
effectively surpasses the civil rights statutes by prohibiting all forms of red-
lining, rather than only those based on racial or ethnic factors. At the
same time, the proposal would not create any unmanageable administra-
tive burdens on lending institutions, since existing legislation already re-
quires most of the record-keeping necessarily involved. 28 It would not
force lenders to make any loans inconsistent with safe and sound banking
practices.' 29 Finally, the assessment of the lending institutions' efforts to
meet local credit needs could provide a strong administrative enforcement
mechanism, while the private cause of action would be available in the
event such mechanisms failed.
This is not to suggest that CRA is insignificant. Despite its limitations, it
explicitly imposes on lending institutions a primary affirmative obligation
to serve local credit needs. 130 This responsibility is particularly significant
126. Compare these proposed elements of an anti-redlining statute with the statutory
requirements of the ECOA. See notes 79-91 and accompanying text supra.
127. Although victims of racial redlining could still bring a lawsuit under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, the view that this Act makes redlining illegal is not universally accepted by the
courts. For a discussion of the Fair Housing Act, see notes 35-69 and accoripanying text
supra. Further, redlining based on the age or location of property in a white neighborhood
cannot be challenged under civil rights statutes whose applicability to redlining extends only
to racial discrimination. For a discussion of the civil rights statutes, see notes 22-70 and
accompanying text supra.
128. In fact, the CRA statement requires no statistical reporting, and agency assessments
will make use of data collected under HMDA and ECOA. See S. REP. No. 95-175, upra
note 10, at 34. See also R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at 114. It was one of the
legislative goals of the CRA to encourage lending institutions to meet community credit
needs without requiring additional bank paperwork S. REP. No. 95-175, supra note 10, at
34.
129. In fact, as currently formulated, CRA only requires banks to meet community credit
needs to the extent possible within safe and sound banking practice. Community Reinvest-
ment Act § 802(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901(b) (West Supp. 1978).




in that it requires, at least in theory, aggressive efforts by the institution to
seek out credit needs.' 3' Although banks have long been subject to a "con-
venience and needs" test when applying for a charter or branch office, un-
til recently this test has generally been used only to consider the
community's need for a deposit facility. The area's credit needs were not
taken into account.' 32
The CRA is also important in that it shifts much of the burden of com-
bating redlining away from the private victim and onto the federal
financial regulatory agencies. Unfortunately, even this factor does not
131. As defined by Senator Proxmire, this affirmative obligation requires "aggressive and
affirmative lending efforts to provide housing and small business loans in the local commu-
nity, with particular emphasis on low and moderate income neighborhoods." See R.
BRANDEL & M. LARGE, supra note 73, at 27.
Lending institutions have expressed their concern that such an obligation will force them
to make less profitable loans, and will in effect demote them from an independent compo-
nent of the free enterprise economy to quasi-governmental bodies. See id at 4. CRA does
in fact indicate a policy decision by Congress to require that lenders meet local credit needs,
even if this means sometimes sacrificing more profitable ventures. In view of the fact that
banks have always been considered quasi-public institutions subject to extensive federal and
state regulation, however, Congress may clearly require them to meet local credit needs. See
In re Thornton, 7 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Colo. 1934); Hawkins Realty Co. v. Hawkins State
Bank, 205 Wis. 406, 236 N.W. 657, 662 (Wis. 1931); Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank,
354 Ill. 554, 188 N.E. 836, 842 (I11. 1933). See also United States v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 397 F. Supp. 418, 420 (C.D. Ca. 1975); New Hampshire Bankers' Ass'n v. Nelson, 336
F. Supp. 1330, 1336 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 460 F.2d 307 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001
(1973); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134, 136 (M.D. Ga. 1965). For a discussion
of the interrelationship of the federal government and the banking industry, see Comment,
supra note 1, at 470-74. See also Comment, supra note 69, at 819-25 & n. II supra.
Tl~e additional concern of the banking industry that CRA is the first step towards "credit
allocation" which will severely restrain the free flow of capital also seems to be without
merit. But see S. REP. No. 95-175, supra note 10, at 82 (additional views of Sens. Morgan,
Tower, Garn, Lugar & Schmitt). The agencies have specifically stated that the regulations
will not require institutions to offer particular kinds or amounts of credit. 43 Fed. Reg.
29918 (1978) (supplementary information to proposed regulations issued July 11, 1978).
132. Under § 5(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976), in issuing
charters for federal savings and loan associations, the FHLBB considers the practices of
local mutual thrift and home financing institutions. In chartering federal banks, the Comp-
troller of the Currency, under 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1976) considers: 1) the financial history and
condition of the bank; 2) the adequacy of its capital structure; 3) its future earnings pros-
pects; 4) its management; 5) the convenience and needs of the community to be served; and
6) whether its corporate powers are consistent with the law. See also S. REP. No. 95-175,
supra note 10, at 33, in which the Senate Committee states that existing law has always
provided authority for the agencies to require institutions to meet local credit needs first.
In recent years, Congress has shown some inclination to develop this standard to include
credit needs, especially in the ECOA and the HMDA. In the HMDA, for instance, Congress
asserted that "some depository institutions have sometimes contributed to the decline of
certain geographic areas by their failure pursuant to their chartering responsibilities to pro-
vide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable terms and conditions."
12 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (1976).
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guarantee deterrence of redlining given the Federal Reserve Board's deci-
sion in ACORN 133 and the regulatory agencies' limited ability to curtail
such practices through denial of a lending institution's application for a
charter, branch office, or other facility. 134
In view of the strong opposition by many lending institutions to the
CRA, 13 5 which undoubtedly will hinder voluntary compliance, enforce-
ment efforts may consequently have to rely on public pressure to defeat
redlining. This approach, while permitting consumer groups and individ-
uals to take a more active role than was possible under the HMDA in
assessing a financial institution's record of meeting community credit
needs,136 counteracts the CRA's intent to shift the burden of enforcing red-
lining regulations to federal financial agencies. Public involvement could
have a significant impact in forcing banks to make at least minimal efforts
to meet local credit needs, but such measures, even when combined with
minimal agency enforcement, will not be sufficient to eliminate redlining.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because neither the civil rights laws, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
133. For a discussion of this case, see notes 107-17 and accompanying text supra. It
appears that the FHLBB may be more diligent than the FRB in enforcing CRA. Since CRA
was enacted, the FHLBB has revised its anti-discriminatory lending regulations to prohibit
discrimination based on the age or location of property. See note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
134. Community Reinvestment Act § 804(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903(2) (West Supp. 1978).
At most, the agencies have some discretion to informally "encourage" lending institutions to
meet local credit needs during regular bank examinations. See R. BRANDEL & M. LARGE,
supra note 73, at 95. Since agency enforcement under CRA is so minimal, Congress should
have provided a private cause of action for these affected by redlining. Some courts have
indicated that when agency enforcement under a statute is inadequate, a cause of action may
sometimes be implied. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In this case, the Court outlined four
criteria for implying a cause of action: 1) whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose
benefit the statute was created; 2) whether there is any evidence of legislative intent either
explicitly or implicitly to create or to deny such a remedy; 3) whether implying a cause of
action would be consistent with the legislative scheme; and 4) whether the creation of a
private cause of action would interfere with the relationship between federal and state law.
Id at 80-85. See also J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In implying a private
cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976), the J..
Case Court stated that such remedies, including implied causes of action, as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose must be provided by the courts, 377 U.S. at 433.
Under these standards, it is reasonable to assume that a private cause of action could be
implied under CRA. A person affected by redlining is obviously within the class to be pro-
tected, and the Act is intended to protect such an individual's interest in obtaining mortgage
money in a nondiscriminatory way. Since agency enforcement under CRA will be minimal,
a private cause of action is necessary to accomplish this purpose.
135. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
136. See note 104 supra.
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nor the Equal Credit Opportunity Act has been effective in eliminating
redlining, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act. The CRA
represents a valuable addition to existing legislation because it emphasizes
that lenders have an affirmative obligation to meet credit needs of their
local communities. Further, it places upon the federal administrative
agencies the primary burden of enforcing that obligation.
Nevertheless, because it fails both to prohibit redlining specifically and
to allow for a private cause of action against lenders when agency enforce-
ment fails, the CRA's forthright policies are unlikely to come to fruition.
Congress must realize that only a comprehensive statute outlawing all
forms of redlining is likely to diminish the problem successfully, and that a
statute can be enacted which is consistent with the free enterprise system of
which private lending institutions are a part.
Anne Marie Regan

